Philosophy 251
Midterm Study Guide — Philosophy 251
The midterm is on Wednesday, 9/30, in class. It will be closed book and closed notes. You will need to bring a blue book to class. Blue books can be purchased at the Alamo for 49¢.
All questions from the midterm will be taken from the questions below. Class on Monday, 9/28, will be a review session. Please come with questions.
An argument is valid just in case ________.
An argument is sound just in case ________.
What is Augustine trying to show when he says,
For a man who does not exist can surely not be mistaken either, and if I am mistaken, therefore I exist.
Descartes argues that there is one thing about which he cannot be deceived. What is that thing, and why does he think he cannot be deceived about it?
Explain Hume’s point in the following passage, and why it is an objection to Descartes:
For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception.
Give a non-question-begging characterization of what it is to have a mind.
Give a non-question-begging characterization of what it is to have a body.
What is substance dualism? According to the substance dualist, what is a mind?
What does Ryle mean when he says that the substance dualism rests upon a “category mistake”? Present and explain one of his examples of a category mistake (the university example, the division example, or the team spirit example), and explain how it relates to the mind-body problem.
What is Logical Behaviorism?
What is Interactionist Dualism? Present one objection to Interactionist Dualism.
What is Epiphenomenalism? Present one objection to Epiphenomenalism.
According to Smart, the Behaviorist holds that,
“…when I”report" a pain, I am not really reporting anything […] but am doing a sophisticated sort of wince…"
Is this a fair description of the Behaviorist position?
What is the identity theory of mental states?
What does it mean to say that mental states are multiply realizable? Explain how functionalism allows for this, and why identity theory does not.
What is the “Hard Problem of Consciousness”?
Nagel uses the example of “what it is like to be a bat” to argue against physicalism. What does he mean by physicalism, and what is his argument?
According to the “Knowledge Argument”, the case of Mary, the neuroscientist who has seen no color, not all facts are physical facts. How does that argument go?
What is the problem of knowing other minds?
What is the “Turing Test”? What is it meant to show? Present and assess one objection to the claim that the test shows what it is meant to show.
What is Searle’s “Chinese Room” example? What is it meant to show?
What is the functionalist theory of mental states?
What is the soul theory of personal identity? Present a thought experiment that causes trouble for soul theory.
What is the spatiotemporal continuity theory of personal identity? Present a thought experiment that causes trouble for this theory.
Present Locke’s example of the Prince and the Cobbler. What does Locke take this example to show? Do you agree? If so, why? If not, why not?
What is the psychological continuity theory of personal identity? Present a thought experiment that causes trouble for this theory.
Suppose God decided to “reuse” Napoleon’s soul when he created you, but he first removed all memories, beliefs, and character traits. Are you Napoleon? What answer does the soul theorist give in this case? The spatiotemporal continuity theory? The psychological continuity theory? What do you think the right answer is?
You go to sleep in your bed. In the morning, a person wakes up who looks just like you, but has all the memories, beliefs, and character traits of Napoleon. Is that person you? What answer does the soul theorist give in this case? The spatiotemporal continuity theory? The psychological continuity theory? What do you think the right answer is?
Why does the possibility of psychological duplication (e.g., in the twice-over brain transplant case) cause trouble for the psychological continuity theory?